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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Dr. H. S. Craig

FROM : Charles H. Taquey *CHT*SUBJECT: Summit Conference.

Document No. _____ DATE: May 27, 1955

Review of this document by CIA has determined that

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Interest that must remain

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Authority: HR 70-2

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Date 22 JUNE 82 Reviewer 103420

1. I made previously (May 18 memo) some remarks on organizational principles ruling the preparation of the Conference, on the kind of strengthening the Western Alliance needs in view of the Conference, and on the type of explanation the basic and troublesome issue of "coexistence" calls for. I propose now to discuss briefly and tentatively the U.S. position in the light of the psychological and political information available at this point.

2. Psychological Factors. In the present confusion, two factors emerge. On the one hand, Background Report No. 1 of USIA leaves little doubt about the prevalent peace psychosis in Western Europe. The other psychological factor, revealed by reactions to the President's remarks at the last press conference, is the fear of a U.S. readiness to reduce, even so slightly, its commitments in Europe. In the average, Europeans appear today equally sensitive to the risk of being abandoned by the U.S. and to that of being dragged into war by "irresponsible" Americans. Our approach to the Conference must give, therefore, some satisfaction to the prevalent desire for peace, but it can rest on the assurance that our military presence in Europe is understood and desired.

3. The Soviet Position. Obviously the Soviet Government has not abandoned its long-term political goals: expansion in Europe and "liberation" of Europe from American influence. Any gain in this direction, for instance a type neutralization which would slowly turn Germany into a satellite, would be welcome by the Reds. But they cannot count on it because the price they would have to pay for such neutralization (return of the Neisse territories) is too high. They may hope that German impatience or Western ineptitude will give them unexpected negotiating advantages, but they will not come to the Conference armed with nothing but such an expectation. They may try to drag into the Conference those Far Eastern questions which divide the Western allies most. The trick succeeded at Berlin; it is less likely to succeed at the "summit". They will endeavor to divide the Western alliance by other means. Now, if it is proven to them that the Western Alliance cannot be disturbed, will they precipitate a break of the Conference, utilizing such a break to isolate the U.S., or will they settle for some measure of "relaxation of tensions"?

4. In order to answer this question we must understand the present Soviet conduct. There are two explanations for this conduct. The signature

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of the Austrian Treaty, the concessions included in the omnibus disarmament proposal of May, the visit to Canossa-Belgrade, and the acceptance of a big four meeting, may aim solely at fostering divisions and exploiting the weaknesses of the West. This explanation fails to explain the timing of Soviet moves and the reversal of the pre-ratification position that such ratification of the Western European agreements would render talks with the West "pointless". Surprising as it is, the Soviet Union must genuinely want some "relaxation of tensions", and we are obliged to accept this view, at least as a complement of explanation. The Soviet Government has therefore a minimum position, a position for a temporary settlement not inconsistent with its long-term aggressive strategy, but not too destructive of the West's security, and likely to give to the world the breathing spell the latter seems to need. It is up to the West to uncover this position by prodding the Soviet Delegation and⁵ submitting proposals of its own.

5. U.S. policy. A U.S. policy can be logically derived from the preceding remarks. The main points are as follows:

(a) Between now and the Conference we must keep the impetus deriving from the ratification of the Western European Treaty. The Western Alliance must be kept and strengthened by economic, cultural and political means. Military positions must be kept up but no new military measures should be envisaged.

(b) Efforts should be made to emphasize Germany's new position in the West, and to make clear that Germany is welcomed as an equal by all the members of the Alliance.

(c) The best way of avoiding the invasion of the Summit Conference by extraneous Far Eastern matters is to begin some kind of negotiations on such matters, at least as a smoke screen, *outside of and prior to the Conference.*

(d) There must be some symbol of Western unity and of German integration present at the Conference. The French Delegate must through some device be made a representative of Continental Europe.

(e) We must go to the Conference with a confident mood. If the Conference aims at limited objectives, does not try to change the present balance of power between East and West, but tries solely to make this alliance less uneasy, the Conference must "succeed".

(f) We must go to the Conference with a wholehearted understanding among allies that no concessions can be made which would change the present balance of power, for instance lead to an envelopment of West Germany by the Soviet orbit.

(g) We must have thoroughly examined, discussed with our allies and, in so far as possible, explained to our public opinion our demands

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as well as the area of concessions which we may envisage in the fields of disarmament, establishment of demilitarized zones in Central Europe, opening up of the satellite countries to intercourse with the West, turn-over of bases of our Western allies, gradual and partial withdrawal of U.S. troops, and East-West trade.

(h) Our allies are ready to support the continued presence of U.S. forces on the Continent of Europe. An understanding must be reached with them that whenever the Soviets raise this question, France and England must carry the ball and, spontaneously, bar concessions which would be unacceptable from the point of view of Western security.

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